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Abstract 
UN Secretary-General António Guterres has initiated various reform pro-
cesses to effectively implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment. Member states have already agreed to reorganise the United Nations 
(UN) development system. While further in-depth reforms are necessary, 
they would be difficult to realise in the current political context. Improve-
ments to working methods and practices, however, are within the realm 
of the possible. 
This study starts by examining what working methods and practices 
helped member states consensually adopt the ambitious 2030 Agenda, 
including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed in it, in Sep-
tember 2015. The High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development 
(HLPF) is currently the heart of the UN’s sustainable development govern-
ance. It is meant to support member states in taking on political leadership 
and responsibility for implementing the 2030 Agenda and SDGs. An analysis 
will show, however, that the HLPF risks failing in its task: the complexity 
of the 2030 Agenda, the HLPF’s broad mandate, the large number of partici-
pants, and their high expectations are creating problems for a forum that – 
having been founded in 2013 – is not sufficiently equipped for this. 
In 2016 member states already decided to review the format and organi-
sational aspects of the HLPF in 2019–2020. Drawing on an analysis of the 
HLPF’s current working methods and practices, this study explores ideas for 
improvements. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
UN Reforms for the 2030 Agenda 
Are the HLPF’s Working Methods and 
Practices “Fit for Purpose”? 
Multilateralism and the United Nations (UN) have 
both been under pressure – and not just since the 
new US administration took office. UN Secretary-
General António Guterres has initiated various 
reforms to make the UN “fit” for its goals and man-
dates. Among other things, these reforms should 
enable the UN to effectively implement the Agenda 
2030 for Sustainable Development. 
In September 2015, the UN member states consen-
sually adopted the ambitious 2030 Agenda and the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed in it. 
Many factors contributed to that success. This study 
examines the extent to which certain working methods 
and practices proved productive. For example, the UN 
working group that developed the SDGs had a com-
position that cut across the usual UN negotiating 
groups. This proved helpful in breaking through 
habitual North-South conflict patterns. Very produc-
tive cooperation with non-state actors was also an 
important prerequisite for the positive results. This 
study therefore starts with a retrospective: what les-
sons can be learned from the working methods and 
practices used in the negotiations on the SDGs and 
the 2030 Agenda? 
The High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Develop-
ment (HLPF) is currently at the heart of the UN’s sus-
tainable development architecture. In July 2018, it 
met for the third time since the adoption of the 2030 
Agenda – so now is a good time for an interim assess-
ment of the working methods and practices that have 
become established in this forum. According to the 
founding idea, the HLPF is to play a “central role in 
overseeing a network of follow-up and review pro-
cesses of the 2030 Agenda at the global level” for the 
implementation of SDGs. Up until now, however, 
the annual HLPF Thematic Reviews and SDG Reviews have 
barely been suitable for a systematic review, lacking 
visible preparation, substantial debate and relevant 
follow-up. The Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) pre-
sented at the HLPF are considered a success. Since 
2016, more than half of the UN’s member states have 
reported to the HLPF on how they implement the 
SDGs. However, the quality of the reports and under-
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lying review processes must be improved. The con-
sequences of the reporting are also unclear. This 
raises the question of the reviews’ relevance. 
Based on an analysis of previous experiences with 
these and other HLPF elements, this study discusses 
possible options for reforms. These are necessary 
because the HLPF threatens to become the victim of 
its own popularity. The high demands placed on the 
2030 Agenda, its complexity, and the large number of 
participants at the HLPF with their high expectations 
also create problems for a forum that is not equipped 
for this. In 2018, many of the participants – who are 
better prepared from year to year – were disappoint-
ed by the lack of results. The Forum can only generate 
real added value if good preparatory processes ensure 
that member states discuss relevant findings at meet-
ings, and then translate them into productive policy 
decisions. 
The UN reforms currently being negotiated in New 
York, especially those of the UN development system 
and the Economic and Social Council, offer an oppor-
tunity to bring about improvements in the HLPF as 
well. After all, it is the declared aim of these reforms 
to optimally support member states in their trans-
formation efforts and to orientate relevant UN pro-
cesses more transparently, more precisely, more con-
sistently, and with a higher degree of integration 
towards the goals of the 2030 Agenda. In order to 
maintain the positive momentum generated by the 
2030 Agenda, the German government, together 
with other interested member states, should support 
a preparatory process for the HLPF Review planned 
for the 74th session of the General Assembly (2019/20). 
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Success at a Difficult Time for 
Multilateralism 
In September 2015, the heads of state and govern-
ment of all UN member states adopted the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development.1 According to its 
title and preamble, the 2030 Agenda aims at nothing 
less than “Transforming Our World”. The agenda 
has four parts: a declaration, the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs), and a section each on the 
means of implementation and on the follow-up and 
review of the SDG implementation. 
The SDGs are the successors to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which were meant to 
have been attained by 2015. The so-called “Post-2015 
Debate” started in 2011. The SDGs also come out 
of the tradition of the Rio Process, which produced 
the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions, 
Agenda 21, and other important agreements in 1992. 
In the run-up to the Rio+20 Conference, it was Co-
lombia (later joined by Guatemala and Peru) that 
encouraged the development of SDGs.2 During the 
Rio+20 conference in 2012, however, member states 
were unable to specify any goals – merely agreeing 
on 26 (!) thematic areas to be covered by the SDGs.3 
In September 2013 the General Assembly decided to 
 
1 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Transforming 
Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(A/RES/70/1) (New York: UN, October 2015). 
2 Paula Caballero, A Short History of the SDGs, 20 September 
2016, https://impakter.com/short-history-sdgs/ (accessed 14 
June 2018). Felix Dodds, Jorge Laguna-Celis and Liz Thomp-
son, From Rio+20 to a New Development Agenda. Building for a 
Sustainable Future (Milton Park: Routledge, 2014); Birgit Lode, 
“SDGs. A Renewed Commitment to Implement Existing and 
Emerging Sustainable Development Goals?”, in UNCSD Rio 
2012. Twenty Years of Sustainability Policies – Now Put into 
Practice?, ed. Marianne Beisheim and Susanne Dröge, SWP 
Research Paper 8/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, June 2012), 31–40. 
3 Farrukh Khan, The SDG Story. An Insider Account of How It All 
Came About, 13 December 2016, https://impakter.com/sdg-
story-insider-account-came/ (accessed 14 June 2018). 
amalgamate the debates on the post-2015 develop-
ment agenda and the SDGs and to negotiate one list 
of goals. In the Rio+20 Outcome Document, member 
states recommended setting up an open working 
group to submit a proposal for a series of SDGs to the 
General Assembly.4 In 2014, after intensive consul-
tations and discussions within the working group, 
participating member states agreed on the 17 SDGs 
with their 169 targets, which were confirmed in the 
subsequent intergovernmental negotiations and 
adopted by the General Assembly in September 2015. 
The SDGs contain all areas already covered by 
the MDGs, including eradicating poverty and hunger, 
promoting health and education, gender equality, 
and the universal provision of water and sanitation. 
Beyond that, a number of new goals have been added: 
affordable and clean energy, decent work and eco-
nomic growth, developing infrastructure and support 
for innovation, sustainable cities and communities, 
and reducing inequality. Environmental protection 
aspects are also consistently integrated above and 
beyond the goals directly geared to ecological aspects 
(protection of the climate, life below water and on 
land). A goal for promoting peace and strengthening 
governance has also been included, which was highly 
controversial until the very end: SDG 16 refers to 
supporting peaceful and inclusive societies, providing 
access to justice for all, and building effective, account-
able and inclusive institutions at all levels. Another 
novelty is that means of implementation were nego-
tiated both within all SDGs and as a separate goal 
(SDG 17). 
It is no longer about development 
policy alone, but about 
political change in all policy areas 
and countries. 
The 2030 Agenda reflects (or so it declares, at least) 
an international minimum consensus on how UN mem-
 
4 UNGA, The Future We Want (A/RES/66/288) (New York: UN, 
11 September 2012). 
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ber states want to shape the future. The agenda’s title 
“Transforming Our World” makes it clear that this 
is no longer just about development policy, but about 
political change in all policy areas and countries. 
Transformation means that structural obstacles to 
development – such as violent conflicts, corruption, 
inequality, and inhumane work – shall be more 
explicitly addressed. The same applies to systemic 
problems and negative spill-over effects in the finan-
cial and trade sectors and in unsustainable consump-
tion and production patterns. Correspondingly, the 
SDGs are also more integrated as regards the three 
dimensions of sustainable development (ecological, 
economic, social) than the MDGs were. This is shown 
in the cross-referencing between individual goals and 
targets.5 
However, reactions to the 2030 Agenda also reveal 
conflict lines. Conservative US media, for example, 
reject the SDGs as unacceptable interference with the 
way of life of free citizens.6 Moreover, North-South 
conflicts continue to flare up. Already during the 
negotiations, for example, many developing coun-
tries, whose priority is poverty reduction, rejected 
the term “planetary boundaries”7. Also, negotiators 
conjured up the spirit of a “New Global Partnership” 
for the means of implementation. Nevertheless, 
donor, developing and emerging countries argued 
(and still argue) about the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”, debating about how 
to share costs fairly, or about the relative importance 
of official development assistance and technology 
transfer (which was a demand from developing and 
emerging countries) versus the mobilisation and effec-
tive use of domestic resources or innovative multi-
stakeholder partnerships (which were concerns of 
 
5 See, e.g., Norichika Kanie, Steven Bernstein, Frank Bier-
mann and Peter M. Haas, “Introduction”, in Governing through 
Goals. Sustainable Development Goals as Governance Innovation, 
ed. Norichika Kanie and Frank Biermann (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2017), 12. 
6 See, e.g., Fox News, 29 September 2015, http://www. 
foxnews.com/world/2015/09/29/un-ignores-science-council-
warnings-in-creating-vast-sustainable-development.html and 
Fox News, 26 June 2016, https://www.google.com/search?q= 
As+UN+pushes+radical+Sustainable+Development+Goals% 
2C+scientists+are+trying+to+make+sense+of+them&ie=utf-
8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b-ab (accessed 18 June 2018). 
7 The expression planetary boundaries describes the finite-
ness of global resources in various biophysical categories: 
Johan Rockström et al., “A Safe Operating Space for Human-
ity”, Nature 461 (September 2009): 472–75. 
donor countries). Moreover, there is no consensus, 
for example, on the interpretation of human rights, 
on gender issues, the role and rights of women or 
families, or the principle of respect for territorial 
integrity and sovereignty. Other divergences have 
intensified, partly because of the US’s increasing 
opposition to multilateral agreements (climate, trade), 
and partly because of the debate on the right to devel-
opment and development models (including the US 
against China). These divergences of interests were 
pacified during the negotiations with political com-
promises, but not truly resolved. 
It is even likely that these conflicts will intensify in 
future, since both the UN system and member states 
now face the difficult task of implementing the 2030 
Agenda. Following the general planning phase, the 
global goals will have to be translated into concrete 
measures. The SDGs formulate objectives, but do not 
specify how they are to be achieved – nor could UN 
member states ever agree on that. These measures 
will have to be bold, integrated and systemic if they 
are to be truly transformative. However, the more con-
crete the measures, the greater the risk that they will 
reflect technocrats’ narrow concerns only for their 
own sector and own interests. Policy coherence – 
always politically difficult to achieve – gains even 
greater importance in the context of implementing 
the SDGs.8 For implementation measures to be con-
sidered appropriate, they must be developed across 
departments, be based on an integrated impact assess-
ment, and be the result of fully participatory pro-
cesses. Optimally, they should also include an evalu-
ation to enable continuous policy learning and 
improvement.9 
In the negotiations there were conflicts over the 
definition of such follow-up and review procedures on 
implementation efforts. In 2012, during the Rio+20 
conference, member states could not agree on a pro-
cedure, but laid the foundation for one with the 
decision to establish the HLPF. In 2013, the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution on its mandate and 
format, including regular reviews.10 The HLPF is now 
 
8 Louis Meulemann, Promoting Policy and Institutional Coher-
ence for the Sustainable Development Goals, Paper for the Com-
mittee of Experts on Public Administration (E/C.16/2018/2) 
(New York: UN, 14 February 2018). 
9 See also OECD, ed., Council Recommendation on Regulatory 
Policy and Governance (Paris: OECD, 2012). 
10 UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects of the High-Level 
Political Forum on Sustainable Development (A/RES/67/290) (New 
York: UN, August 2013). 
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at the heart of the UN sustainable development gov-
ernance; its working methods and practices are there-
fore at the core of this study. 
Focus: Working Methods and Practices 
Some of the international relations literature has 
been increasingly looking at shared practices as the 
“driving force behind the formation of order and 
change”.11 Here, the practices used in everyday inter-
national politics have become the focus of scientific 
interest. The authors usually found their theories on 
research results from the literature on bureaucratic 
politics or organisational learning.12 Many of them 
advocate going beyond the controversial theoretical 
debate on whether structures or actors are crucial to 
results – the two factors are seen by them as being 
mutually constitutive and are both efficacious for the 
chosen practices and policy outcomes. The broader 
scientific literature on the United Nations is also deal-
ing with working methods and practices – whether 
the Charter and other documents are examined from 
a legal perspective,13 the negotiation processes by 
diplomacy experts,14 or the UN bureaucracy from an 
administrative-science perspective.15 
Within the UN itself, debates on improving work 
routines have been going on almost since the organi-
sation was founded. Experts criticise the struggles for 
power and interests that often take priority, the lack 
 
11 Frank Gadinger, “Praxistheorie in den internationalen 
Beziehungen”, in Handbuch Internationale Beziehungen, ed. 
Frank Sauer and Carlo Masala (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2017), 
399; Christian Bueger and Frank Gadinger, International Prac-
tice Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
12 Christopher M. Jones, “Bureaucratic Politics and Orga-
nizational Process Models”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of 
International Studies (2017), f–7, http://internationalstudies. 
oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001. 
0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-2 (accessed 14 June 2018). 
Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning II: 
Theory, Method and Practice (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 
1996). 
13 Simon Chesterman, Ian Johnstone and David Malone, 
Law and Practice of the United Nations. Documents and Commentary 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
14 Courtney B. Smith, Politics and Process at the United Nations. 
The Global Dance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 
15 Julian Junk, “Der Beitrag der Verwaltungswissenschaft 
für das Lehr- und Forschungsfeld UN Studies”, in UN Studies. 
Umrisse eines Lehr- und Forschungsfeldes, ed. Manuel Fröhlich 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), 142–59. 
of knowledge or capacities, and the persistence of 
certain standard procedures and discourses as prob-
lems that typically hinder the work of the UN.16 An 
example of a successful political initiative concerning 
the UN’s working methods are the efforts of the so-called 
S-5 Group (Small Five Group: Costa Rica, Jordan, Liech-
tenstein, Switzerland, Singapore). The Group has ad-
vocated “modern working methods” for the Security 
Council, which it considered essential for the Coun-
cil to function more efficiently.17 The S-5 proposals 
for reorganisation focused primarily on the format 
of meetings, type of information and information 
gathering, and access for non-governmental actors. 
Informal new working methods (without any change 
to the rules of procedure) achieved more transparency 
and participation in decision-finding and decision-
making processes.18 It has not been possible, however, 
to formalise the new working methods that have since 
become common practice. Resistance came from 
the P-5, the five permanent members of the Security 
Council (China, France, Russian Federation, United 
Kingdom, USA) – who benefit most from the existing 
rules of procedure. De facto, however, the member 
states are making active use of the new formats. 
Major reform proposals have less 
chance of finding consensus than 
incremental changes at the level of 
working methods. 
The basic assumption underlying such initiatives 
– and this study – is that major reform proposals 
have less chance of finding consensus than incre-
mental changes at the level of working methods. 
The latter are easier to effect, but they can still bring 
about substantial improvement.19 Another example 
 
16 See, e.g., Stephen Browne and Thomas G. Weiss, Making 
Change Happen. Enhancing the UN’s Contributions to Development 
(New York: World Federation of UN Associations, 2012). 
17 Pascale Baeriswyl, “Backdoor Revolution. Modern Work-
ing Methods for a More Efficient UN Security Council”, 
German Review on the United Nations 61, no. 5 (2013): 195–200. 
18 Helmut Volger, “Mehr Transparenz und mehr Beteili-
gung. Die informelle Reform der Arbeitsmethoden des UN-
Sicherheitsrats”, Vereinte Nationen 58, no. 5 (2010): 195–203; 
Martin Niemetz, Reforming UN Decision-Making Procedures. Pro-
moting a Deliberative System for Global Peace and Security (London: 
Routledge, 2015). 
19 See Marc Engelhardt, Weltgemeinschaft am Abgrund. 
Warum wir eine starke UNO brauchen (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 
2018). 
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is the procedure that has been used for selecting the 
current UN Secretary-General: instead of being selected 
by the Security Council, as the Charter foresees, part 
of the process was moved to the UN General Assembly 
by its President. All candidates presented themselves 
to the member states and answered their questions in 
informal dialogues.20 The results of this process could 
then hardly be circumvented. This has set new stand-
ards that will probably be difficult to undo. 
Practices and working methods within the UN are thus 
the central subject of the following analysis (which 
will use the two terms synonymously). They refer to 
all kinds of formal guidelines and rules for the func-
tioning of UN bodies, but also informal practices. This 
includes mandates, negotiation formats, coordination 
and decision-making processes, cooperation with non-
state actors, knowledge transfer, resource manage-
ment and financing regulations, and other systematic 
collective practices and work routines. The study’s 
empirical focus is on intergovernmental processes, 
specifically on the practices and working methods in 
the negotiation processes for the SDGs and during the 
annual HLPF. Its analysis is based on an evaluation of 
existing literature and reports, as well as participatory 
observation and on-site discussions with participants 
and observers of the negotiation processes and HLPF 
(2011–2018). In the final section, the results of the 
analysis are placed in the context of the UN reforms 
currently being negotiated in New York. 
Benchmark: 
Strengthening Result-Orientation 
As mentioned above, the 2030 Agenda sets extremely 
high standards: no less than “transforming our world” 
towards sustainable development. However, this newly 
postulated paradigm of a more systemic, integrated 
and inclusive approach to sustainable development 
is far from established. Moreover, the very concept 
of multilateralism has been in a serious political crisis 
ever since. And yet it is precisely the function of 
multilateral institutions to stabilise mutual expec-
 
20 Mette Holm, “Nudging the Decision on UN Secretary 
General from the Security Council”, Huffington Post, 1 October 
2017, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mette-holm/nudging-
the-decision-on-u_b_14076596.html?guccounter=1 (accessed 
14 June 2018). This was based on the following resolution: 
UNGA, Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly (A/RES/ 
69/321) (New York: UN, 22 September 2015). 
tations regarding the behaviour of cooperation part-
ners, especially in crisis situations. Ideally, these insti-
tutions should promote evidence-based learning, en-
able political decision-making on collective solutions, 
and then help with implementation and follow-up. 
For this to succeed, however, structures and processes 
intended to lead to decisions must be well-developed, 
and resources must be made available for them. This 
is the basic idea behind the “Fit for Purpose” discussion 
that has gained traction within the UN since 2014.21 
This is not necessarily a case of constantly expanding 
institutions, but also of curbing bureaucratic pro-
liferation and (re-)aligning structures and processes 
with goals (form follows function). 
The political will of member states to reform the 
UN is usually limited to cost-saving – or at least cost-
neutral – options, which must additionally be in 
line with the interests of the respective states. To that 
extent, even the Trump administration supports UN 
reforms.22 
A “backdoor revolution” could be 
more promising. 
Demands for far-reaching reforms that would 
require a change to the UN Charter, however well 
they sound, are unlikely to find consensus and might 
even generate more resistance than necessary.23 In 
the current political situation it seems more sensible 
to follow a piecemeal approach, reforming the work-
ing methods so as to increase their effectiveness and 
efficiency.24 Such a “backdoor revolution” could be 
more promising.25 
 
21 The term was coined in 2014 by Deputy Secretary-
General Jan Eliasson and further developed by John Hendra, 
Senior Coordinator “UN Fit for Purpose”. 
22 See the 2017 Political Declaration for UN Reform High 
Level Event initiated by US Ambassador Nikki Haley and 
signed by 132 member states, https://digitallibrary.un.org/ 
record/1310817/files/A_72_532_Rev-1-EN.pdf (accessed 18 
June 2018). See also Josef Braml, “Amerikas Forderung nach 
UN-Reformen”, Vereinte Nationen 66, no. 1 (2018): 9–14. 
23 As, for example, the call for a “Global Sustainable Devel-
opment Council” armed with sanctions on a par with the UN 
Security Council; thus Federal Development Minister Müller 
2015 in an interview with ZEIT Online, https://www. zeit.de/ 
wirtschaft/2015-09/bundesentwicklungsminister-gerd-
mueller-un-nachhaltigkeitsziele/komplettansicht (accessed 
18 June 2018). 
24 Sven Bernhard Gareis, “Eine unendliche Geschichte? 
Die Reform der Hauptorgane der Vereinten Nationen”, in 
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At the same time, the principles of the 2030 Agenda 
should be upheld, even against political resistance. 
All reform efforts should enable the HLPF to best im-
plement the added value of the 2030 Agenda, in par-
ticular its focus on transformation, interlinkages 
(synergies and trade-offs between goals) and policy 
coherence, as well as accountability to citizens and 
the principle to “Leave No One Behind”. To this end, 
the HLPF can and should generate politically relevant 
results as per its mandate, to provide policy leadership 
and guidance on the implementation of the 2030 
Agenda. This is the central benchmark for evaluating 
the HLPF’s working methods and practices. 
How then should the HLPF’s working methods 
and practices be reformed? But before going there, a 
look back will help to empirically underpin the cor-
responding proposals: What lessons can be learned 
from the negotiation processes on the SDGs and the 
2030 Agenda? And how are the current working 
methods of the HLPF to be assessed? 
 
Die Vereinten Nationen vor globalen Herausforderungen, ed. Hel-
mut Volger and Norman Weiß (Potsdam: Universitätsverlag 
Potsdam, 2011), 41–55 (42f.). 
25 Baeriswyl, “Backdoor Revolution” (see note 17). 
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The negotiation processes on the SDGs and the 2030 
Agenda in 2013–2015 involved interesting new work-
ing methods and practices. These include (1) other 
negotiation formats, (2) more meaningful partici-
pation processes, (3) more intensive UN coordination 
mechanisms, and (4) a multi-level approach to im-
plementation and review. 
The OWG: Innovative Negotiation 
Formats 
In late 2013, in accordance with the Outcome Docu-
ment of the Rio+20 Conference, the General Assembly 
set up the so-called Open Working Group (OWG), which 
was to submit a proposal on a list of SDGs to the 
next General Assembly. Throughout 2014 the OWG 
developed a catalogue of 17 SDGs, which ultimately 
remained the same, except for a few changes. As the 
following analysis will show, many of the participants 
and observers agree that this success was due to the 
OWG’s innovative working methods. 
The starting point was that, according to the 
Rio+20 Outcome Document, the OWG was to decide 
on its “method of work”. The composition of the OWG 
was innovative in itself: since interest in working 
in the OWG was high, 72 member states ultimately 
shared the 30 seats.26 This format created opportuni-
ties for entirely new coalitions,27 and moderated the 
 
26 Felix Dodds, David Donoghue and Jimena Leiva Roesch, 
Negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals. A Transformational 
Agenda for an Insecure World (Milton Park/New York: Taylor & 
Francis Ltd, 2017), 31f. 
27 Pamela S. Chasek and Lynn M. Wagner, “Breaking the 
Mold: A New Type of Multilateral Sustainable Development 
Negotiation”, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
normally dominant role of the usual negotiating 
groups. Accordingly, at least in the beginning, group-
based priorities were less visible, whether in the 
North-South conflict line, i.e. the Group of 77 and 
China (currently 134 developing countries) ‘against’ 
the industrialised countries or the EU, or in other 
constellations.28 
Many observers agree that the way the two co-chairs 
conducted the negotiations has played a decisive role, 
both in the OWG and later in the intergovernmental 
negotiations under the General Assembly. The Ken-
yan UN Ambassador Macharia Kamau,29 co-chaired 
both negotiations, first as co-chair of the OWG (to-
gether with the Hungarian UN Ambassador Csaba 
Körosi), and then as co-facilitator with the Irish UN 
Ambassador David Donoghue. This provided for con-
tinuity over the two negotiation rounds and kept the 
number of changes to the SDGs as proposed by the 
OWG to a minimum. The two ambassadors also led 
the difficult intergovernmental negotiations on the 
other three parts of the 2030 Agenda (declaration, 
means of implementation, follow-up and review). 
When it came to the drafting of the document, they 
succeeded in “holding the pen” for a long time, circu-
lating a zero draft relatively late in the process (1 June 
 
Law and Economics 16, no. 3 (June 2016): 397–413; Olav 
Kjørven, “The Unlikely Journey to the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development”, Impakter, 8 December 2016, https:// 
impakter.com/impakter-essay-unlikely-journey-2030-agenda-
sustainable-development/ (accessed 14 June 2018). 
28 Other groups are, for example, the African or Arab 
group, the small island developing states (SIDS), the least 
developed countries, land-locked developing countries, or 
middle-income countries. 
29 Macharia Kamau, Pamela Chasek and David O’Connor, 
Transforming Multilateral Diplomacy. The Inside Story of the Sustain-
able Development Goals (New York: Routledge, 2018). 
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2015) and soon afterwards (2 August 2015) adopting 
the sixth version revised under their aegis.30 This is 
unusual as, towards the end of such negotiations, 
changes are normally negotiated sentence by sen-
tence, which often produces long documents that are 
relatively void of content. The fact that the OWG has 
agreed to another procedure is generally seen as an 
expression of extraordinary leadership and the high 
degree of trust and ownership that had developed 
over the long phase of consultations.31 It also helped 
that, due to the unusually high and dense frequency 
of the meetings, the same negotiators met again and 
again. 
The working methods of the OWG also enabled a 
high degree of argument-based deliberation. During 
the so-called “stocktaking process” content was dis-
cussed both broadly and for a comparatively long 
time (about a year) without any concrete text proposal 
being negotiated. The two co-chairs worked closely 
with non-state actors, both NGOs and experts (see the 
next section). According to scientific studies, such a 
deliberative mode can be more productive than an 
interest-driven mode of negotiation (“arguing” versus 
“bargaining”).32 Only at the very end did several 
power-driven interventions by individual member 
states lead to a weakening of individual wordings in 
the document.33 One critical analysis even speaks 
of a creeping “de-politicisation” of the SDGs through 
“inflation” and the associated softening of policy 
goals – as the result of both broad stakeholder par-
 
30 David Donoghue, My Perspective on the SDG Negotiations, 
2016 (blog entry on former Deliver-2030 website; printed 
by author). Dodds, Donoghue and Roesch, Negotiating the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (see note 26), 76. 
31 Chasek and Wagner, “Breaking the Mold” (see note 27); 
Kjørven, “Unlikely Journey” (see note 27); Donoghue, My Per-
spective (see note 30). 
32 Cornelia Ulbert and Thomas Risse “Deliberately Chang-
ing the Discourse: What Does Make Arguing Effective?”, Acta 
Politica 40, no. 3 (2005): 351–67. However, others question 
these findings: see Jens Steffek, “Deliberation and Global 
Governance”, in The Oxford Handbook of International Political 
Theory, ed. Chris Brown and Robyn Eckersley (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 440–52. 
33 Bhumika Muchhala, “Last-minute Lack of Transparency 
Weakens Sustainable Development Goals”, The Guardian, 
13 August 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development-professionals-network/2015/aug/13/lack-of-
transparency-sustainable-development-goals-negotiations-
united-nations (accessed 18 June 2018). 
ticipation and intergovernmental compromises.34 In 
general, however, state and non-state actors praised 
the process as transparent, fair, participatory and 
largely oriented towards balance and understanding. 
Enhanced Cooperation with 
Non-State Actors 
In the run-up to the SDG negotiations, non-state 
actors had already submitted concrete proposals on 
lists of goals.35 Moreover, the “High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Agenda”, appointed 
by the UN Secretary-General in 2012, consulted glob-
ally and presented its report in May 2013.36 These 
reports had considerable influence on the discussion 
about SDG design. 
During the negotiations, cooperation with non-
state actors reached new heights. First, there were 
the consultations and statements of the Major Groups 
and other Stakeholders (MGoS) usually involved in these 
UN processes.37 In addition, the two co-chairs held 
one-hour-long morning meetings with non-state actors 
during the OWG. Those who observed the negotia-
tions could see and hear again and again that pro-
posals from these informal rounds were taken up in 
the official meetings and later also in the text.38 
The potential of social media and the Internet has 
also been used for global consultations. The Post-2015 
 
34 Manuel Rivera, “Entpolitisierung im Konsens. Ein kri-
tischer Blick auf die Entstehung der SDG”, in Globale politische 
Ziele. Bestandsaufnahme und Ausblick des Post-2015 Prozesses, 
ed. Philipp Lepenies and Elena Sondermann (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 2017), 219–46. 
35 E.g. Centre for International Governance Innovation, 
ed., Toward a Post-2015 Development Paradigm (Waterloo, 2011). 
36 UN, ed., A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and 
Transform Economies through Sustainable Development. The Report 
of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Develop-
ment Agenda (New York: UN, 30 May 2013), 30–31. 
37 Since the first Rio Conference in 1992, Agenda 21 has 
identified nine major groups that play a special role in sus-
tainable development. These are (1) women, (2) children 
and youth, (3) indigenous peoples, (4) non-governmental 
organisations, (5) local authorities, (6) workers and trade 
unions, (7) business and industry, (8) scientific and techno-
logical community, (9) farmers. “Other stakeholders” were 
added at the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, including volun-
teers, persons with disabilities, educational institutions and 
the group on ageing. 
38 See also Donoghue, My Perspective (see note 30) and 
Kamau et al., Transforming Multilateral Diplomacy (see note 29). 
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Task Team (led by UNDP) was at the heart of many of 
these activities and initiated national and thematic 
consultations on the SDGs, which were later evaluat-
ed for the Secretary General’s panel and the OWG.39 
Individuals were also able to participate in the con-
sultations as part of the “MyWorld” survey and via 
the “World-We-Want” website. An important basis 
for this was the high level of transparency in the 
negotiations, which were live-streamed online. This 
made it possible for observers even outside of New 
York to closely align their submissions with the cur-
rent state of negotiations. The “Beyond 2015” cam-
paign, supported by NGOs, mobilised for this world-
wide. 
Business actors also participated directly in the 
negotiations, for example through the Major Group 
Business & Industry. In addition, companies were 
informed about the SDG negotiations by the UN 
Global Compact Office. As a result, economic actors 
were able to consider from an early stage what the 
SDGs would mean for companies’ core business and 
sustainability reporting. Since 2015, the Global Com-
pact, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development have 
developed a whole series of tools to enable companies 
to align their activities with the SDGs. Corporate foun-
dations also took up the SDGs. For example, some of 
them (including Rockefeller, Hilton, Ford and Master 
Card Foundation) set up a specific “SDG Philanthropy 
Fund” to finance, for example, data analysis or 
partnerships for the SDGs. The media-supported 
“Project Everyone” disseminated film spots and other 
visual information, not least the now well-known 
SDG icons.40 
Lastly, many experts were involved in the consulta-
tions. The Major Group Scientific and Technological 
Community was not very visible at first. But many 
scientists were directly involved in the negotiations. 
Other parties to the process also worked with scien-
tific findings and concepts. Environmental NGOs, for 
example, engaged with the findings on planetary 
boundaries and tried to anchor them in the list of 
goals. Many participants found the ‘informal retreats’ 
useful that were organised by the “Independent Re-
search Forum”41 during the negotiations: here mem-
 
39 Kjørven, “Unlikely Journey” (see note 27). 
40 See https://www.globalgoals.org/ (accessed 18 June 2018). 
41 This was supported by eleven research institutes, includ-
ing the World Resources Institute, Overseas Development 
ber states were able to discuss their questions openly 
and confidentially with experts. Moreover, new net-
works of experts were founded, and existing networks 
took up the SDGs. In 2012, Jeffrey Sachs asked Secre-
tary-General Ban Ki-moon for his support in establish-
ing the “Sustainable Development Solutions Network” 
(SDSN). Initially conceived as a scientific network, the 
SDSN has now grown into a globally active network 
of experts. The SDSN Secretariat was considered influ-
ential in the context of the post-2015 debate. As early 
as 2013, the SDSN submitted a proposal for a list of 
ten goals, which was repeatedly developed further 
through multiple public consultation rounds.42 A simi-
lar process followed to elaborate suggestions for the 
SDGs’ indicators.43 In 2015, two established internati-
onal scientific umbrella associations (the International 
Council for Science, ICSU, and the International 
Social Science Council, ISSC) coordinated a “review” 
of the freshly negotiated goals and targets with global 
scientific participation.44 The German Research Foun-
dation (DFG) also organised an event in New York and 
discussed the role of science for the upcoming SDGs.45 
The DFG also supports the international research pro-
gramme “Future Earth”.46 Finally, many scientists par-
ticipated in the first (pilot) issues of the Global Sustain-
able Development Report (GSDR) in 2014–2016.47 This 
report is intended to bundle scientific contributions 
on the SDGs for the HLPF. 
 
Institute, Stockholm Environment Institute, and other insti-
tutes from Asia, Latin America and Africa. 
42 SDSN, An Action Agenda for Sustainable Development, Report 
(New York, 2013). 
43 SDSN, Indicators and a Monitoring Framework for Sustainable 
Development Goals: Launching a Data Revolution for the SDGs, 
Report (New York, 2015). 
44 ICSU/ISSC, Review of Targets for the Sustainable Development 
Goals: The Science Perspective, (Paris: International Council for 
Science, 2015). 
45 See Marianne Beisheim, Hedda Lokken, Nils aus dem 
Moore, Laszlo Pinter and Wilfried Rickels, Measuring Sustain-
able Development. How can Science Contribute to Realizing the 
SDGs?, Working Paper FG 8, 2015/02 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
schaft und Politik, April 2015). 
46 German Committee Future Earth, The Contribution of 
Science in Implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (Stutt-
gart, 2016). 
47 Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform https:// 
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/globalsdreport (accessed 
18 June 2018). 
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Improved Internal UN Coordination 
The added value of the 2030 Agenda lies above all 
in the fact that the goals and targets – which them-
selves are not necessarily new – have been more 
systematically and closely interwoven than in pre-
vious UN agreements. This feature was founded on 
the insight that “transformation” will not be achieved 
through individual measures in individual policy 
areas. Rather, systemic relationships have to be taken 
into account and far-reaching changes are necessary 
in order to successfully deal with the structural 
causes of mostly complex problems.48 However, many 
trade-offs have yet to be resolved within the 17 SDGs 
and their 169 targets. 
All this now places high demands on the UN sys-
tem (as well as on member states) for implementa-
tion, in terms of coordination, cooperation and co-
herence – demands that have long occupied the UN 
and rarely been fully met in the past.49 Observers 
underline the importance of inter-agency task forces for 
the SDG negotiations.50 The “UN System Task Team” 
(UNTT) and later the “Technical Support Team”(TST) 
prepared background papers and reports that struc-
tured the negotiations and drove their content. Many 
stakeholders, including the Co-Chairs, especially 
praised the contributions of UNDESA (United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs) to the 
negotiations. The Department is part of the United 
Nations Secretariat. The former “Division on Sustain-
able Development” (DSD) operated as HLPF secretariat 
until 2018. 
Experienced observers like to recall experiences 
from the Rio process.51 One year after the 1992 Rio 
Summit, the “Inter-Agency Committee on Sustainable 
Development” was set up to ensure effective coopera-
 
48 See also Marianne Beisheim and Susanne Dröge,” Klima-
politik und 2030-Agenda – Potentiale für nachhaltiges Navi-
gieren”, in Ausblick 2017: Krisenlandschaften. Konfliktkonstellatio-
nen und Problemkomplexe internationaler Politik, ed. Volker 
Perthes, SWP-Studie 1/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, January 2017), 59–62. 
49 Joachim Müller, “United Nations System Coordination: 
The Challenge of Working Together”, in Journal of International 
Organization Studies 1, no. 1 (2010): 29–56. 
50 Kjørven, “Unlikely Journey” (see note 27). 
51 Jan-Gustav Strandenaes, The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development – W(h)ither Its Success?, November 2016, https:// 
www.nachhaltigkeitsrat.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/The_ 
2030_Agenda_-_Whither_its_success_JG_Strandenaes.pdf 
(accessed 18 June 2018). 
tion and coordination within the UN system.52 “Task 
managers” were appointed for individual Agenda 21 
programme items to develop coordinated implemen-
tation measures in cooperation with relevant organi-
sations.53 However, while negotiating the 2030 
Agenda, negotiators found the model “silo-ish”. How-
ever, following the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, it 
became clear that competencies and leadership needed 
to be clarified. Currently, the UN refers to custodian 
agencies, i.e. it assigns a kind of curatorial role to cer-
tain UN units which take over coordination services 
for an SDG (but without being solely responsible 
for the respective goal). Nevertheless, dealing with 
infighting over competencies and turf wars for re-
sources remains a challenge. 
Multi-Level and Bottom-Up Approach to 
Implementation and Review 
Unlike with the MDGs, a follow-up and review mecha-
nism for the SDGs was already established in the 2030 
Agenda itself. This is remarkable, because resistance 
to any kind of monitoring or reporting was initially 
very high. No such procedure for the SDGs could be 
agreed at the Rio+20 Conference in 2012, not even 
within the initial framework of the HLPF envisaged 
in the Rio+20 Outcome Document. It was only in 
2013 that the resolution on the HLPF stipulated that 
regular reviews should take place within its frame-
work from 2016 onwards.54 
The 2030 Agenda provides for an annual Progress 
Report by the Secretary-General. This is complemented 
by a more detailed “SDG Report” from the UN Statis-
tical Commission, covering all 17 SDGs goals and the 
more than 230 indicators. These indicators were 
developed by the “Inter-agency and Expert Group on 
 
52 Jerry Pubantz and John Allphin Moore, Jr., “Inter-
Agency Committee on Sustainable Development (IACSD)”, 
in Encyclopedia of the United Nations (New York: Facts On File, 
2010). 
53 From 2001, this task was assumed by the newly created 
UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), 
which created new coordination mechanisms, such as UN 
Water and UN Energy. See CEB, Annual Overview Report of the 
United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination for 
2017 (E/2018/48) (New York: UN, 26 February 2018). 
54 UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects (see note 10). 
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SDG Indicators” in 2015–2017 and are now to be con-
tinuously developed further.55 
In addition, the 2030 Agenda encourages member 
states to conduct Voluntary National Reviews (VNRs) 
as “regular and inclusive reviews of progress at the 
national and subnational level” and then report back 
to the HLPF.56 These national reviews at the HLPF 
“shall be voluntary, while encouraging reporting”.57 
From the outset, the idea was to promote national 
implementation through a bottom-up review pro-
cess.58 To this end, the VNRs in the HLPF are to be 
preceded by national implementation and review 
processes that fully involve both government and 
society (whole-of-government and whole-of-society 
approach). In accordance with the 2030 Agenda’s 
principle of universality, this is expected of all mem-
ber states. In addition, reviews should also take place 
at the regional level. However, as member states did 
not agree on the role of the regional forums, they 
negotiated an individual solution whereby each 
region should seek an appropriate regional forum. 
The fact that these review processes had already 
been agreed upon with the adoption of the 2030 
Agenda has led to the rapid establishment of respec-
tive work processes at the national, regional, and 
global level. This in turn keeps the implementation 
of the 2030 Agenda on the cards and contributes to 
a relatively high degree of continuity in working 
towards the goals. At the UN, the HLPF is at the heart 
of these processes. However, its mandate was decided 
by member states in 2013 – in other words, before 
the 2030 Agenda was adopted. This now creates 
problems with its working methods and practices. 
 
55 See https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/ (accessed 27 February 
2018). 
56 UNGA, 2030 Agenda (see note 1), para. 79. 
57 Ibid., para. 84. 
58 Marianne Beisheim, Reviewing the Post-2015 Sustainable 
Development Goals and Partnerships. A Proposal for a Multi-level 
Review at the High-level Political Forum, SWP Research Paper 
1/2015 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 
2015), 7f. 
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Since 2013, the HLPF has brought together delegations 
from all UN member states in New York. They meet 
annually in July for eight days under the auspices of 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), as well as 
every four years for a further two days in September 
at the level of heads of state and government under 
the auspices of the General Assembly. Both the UN 
General Assembly resolution on the HLPF adopted in 
2013 and the 2030 Agenda attribute to the HLPF “a 
central role in overseeing a network of follow-up and 
review processes”.59 What working methods and prac-
tices are being used to implement this “central role” 
now, that is three years into the implementation of 
the 2030 Agenda and SDGs? 
The mandate of the HLPF was very broadly formulat-
ed in 2013, which now determines – and burdens – 
the annual programme planning. Among other things, 
various reports are expected to be addressed, such as 
the Secretary-General’s annual SDG progress report 
and other reports from the UN system, the regional 
commissions, reports on the various thematic areas, 
and reports on financing for development (see Chart 
1, p. 19). The HLPF is also supposed to pay particular 
attention to regional developments as well as the spe-
cial needs and concerns of different country groups. 
The HLPF is in danger of falling 
victim to its own success. 
This wealth of input and tasks means that reports 
are usually only taken note of, but that their results 
are not evaluated or discussed, and no decisions based 
 
59 UNGA, 2030 Agenda (see note 1), para. 82. 
on them are made. At the same time, political and so-
cietal interest in the HLPF is high (see Table 1, p. 18), 
as are expectations. The HLPF is thus in danger of fall-
ing victim to its own success if it cannot fulfil the 
high demands with current processes and resources. 
The working methods and practices of five im-
portant building blocks of the HLPF will be analysed 
below: (1) Thematic and SDG reviews as well as (2) the 
Voluntary National Reviews are meant to evaluate the 
implementation status and promote learning pro-
cesses. For the inclusion of non-state actors, the HLPF has 
a mandate to provide (3) a platform for partnerships, 
including through the participation of the MGoS and 
other relevant stakeholders. (4) A scientific report, 
the Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR), is also 
mandated. The HLPF specifies (5) a Ministerial Declara-
tion as its outcome. 
Thematic and SDG Reviews: 
Need More Preparation to Add Value 
The 2030 Agenda mandates the HLPF to hold “the-
matic reviews of progress on the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals, including cross-cutting issues”.60 In 2016, 
member states agreed in a resolution to discuss each 
year at the HLPF an overarching theme (Thematic 
Reviews) and to discuss selected SDGs in more detail 
(SDG Reviews) (see Table 2).61 
 
60 UNGA, 2030 Agenda (see note 1), para. 85. 
61 UNGA, Follow-up and Review of the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development at the Global Level (A/RES/70/299), 29 July 2016, 
para. 2–5. 
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By the end of the first four-year cycle, all 17 SDGs 
should have been reviewed “in-depth”, taking into 
account their “integrated, indivisible and interlinked 
nature”.62 This is precisely where the added value of 
these reviews with the HLPF could and should lie: a 
solid and honest analysis of the state of implementa-
tion with special attention to the principles of the 
2030 Agenda (transformative, integrated, inclusive, 
etc.), on the basis of which politically relevant recom-
mendations for further implementation can then be 
generated. 
 
62 Ibid., para. 2 and 5. 
The reality is different. In 2017, three three-hour 
panels for the Thematic Reviews and one two-hour 
panel each for the SDG Reviews took place during the 
first week of the HLPF. In 2018 this was reversed to 
create more time for SDG reviews. In 2018 UNDESA 
also tried to give the panels more structural strength. 
First, a short statistical assessment of each SDG’s tar-
gets was given. Representatives of member states, 
international and regional organisations as well as 
academia and society were asked to focus their panel 
contributions on country experiences and lessons 
learned, also discussing synergies and trade-offs among 
the SDGs and with other SDGs. This was followed by a 
Table 1 
Signs for Growing Interest in HLPF 
 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Senior Government Representatives*   77  125  
Registered Participants/Stakeholders*  1,500  2,458  2,200  
Reporting Countries (VNRs)  22  43  46  51 
Side Events   147  260  
* Data sets vary and cannot be consistently compared over time. 
Source: Own compilation using UN-HLPF website. 
Table 2 
HLPF Thematic and SDG Reviews 
 Thematic Review SDG Reviews 
2017 Eradicating poverty and promoting 
prosperity in a changing world 
SDG 1 No Poverty,  
SDG 2 No Hunger,  
SDG 3 Good Health,  
SDG 5 Gender Equality,  
SDG 9 Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure,  
SDG 14 Life Below Water 
2018 Transformation towards sustain-
able and resilient societies 
SDG 6 Clean Water and Sanitation,  
SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy,  
SDG 11 Sustainable Cities and Communities,  
SDG 12 Responsible Consumption and Production, 
SDG 15 Life on Land 
2019 Empowering people and ensuring 
inclusiveness and equality 
SDG 4 Quality Education,  
SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth,  
SDG 11 Reduced Inequalities,  
SDG 13 Climate Action,  
SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions 
 
 Thematic and SDG Reviews: Need More Preparation to Add Value 
 SWP Berlin 
 UN Reforms for the 2030 Agenda 
 October 2018 
 19 
debate in plenary session (usually very short, for lack 
of time). 
In view of the time pressures, good preparatory 
and follow-up processes are essential. The 2030 Agenda 
already provides for the sensible use of existing 
review procedures (including their reports, data, 
and analyses).63 Thematic Reviews will be supported 
“by reviews by the functional commissions of the 
Economic and Social Council and other intergovern-
mental bodies and forums which should reflect the 
integrated nature of the Goals as well as the inter-
linkages between them”.64 To implement this man-
date, working groups of the extended Executive Com-
mittee for Economic and Social Affairs (ECESA Plus, 
a coordination platform originally used to prepare 
for the Rio+20 Conference) evaluate the material 
from the UN system on the SDGs being reviewed. 
They present the results in short reports (background 
notes),65 which are consolidated before the HLPF in 
an Expert Group Meeting. 
 
63 UNGA, 2030 Agenda (see note 1), para. 74f.: The reviews 
should “build on existing platforms and processes [… and] 
avoid duplication”. 
64 Ibid., para. 85. 
65 See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf/2018# 
inputs (accessed 18 June 2018). 
However, even experts are unaware of these well-
structured background notes, including their refer-
ences to interlinkages and some recommendations. 
The HLPF did not work with them on the podiums 
either in 2017 or in 2018. Yet these papers could help 
to make discussions more focused and result-oriented. 
The underlying problem is twofold: first, these papers 
have no official status; second, UNDESA has no funds 
to reimburse experts’ travel costs to the panels. Those 
who participate on a self-financed basis come mainly 
to present the work of their own organisation; how-
ever, this is not necessarily what is most needed. 
One example of a relatively good preparatory and 
follow-up process was the review of SDG 14 (Life be-
low Water) in 2017. In preparation, a three-day global 
Oceans Conference was held in New York in June 2017. 
The SDG review at the HLPF then referred to the results 
of the conference. The decision to hold the confer-
ence was taken by the General Assembly in December 
2015, which led to a comparatively stringent prepara-
tory process. One of the main organisers of the con-
ference, the then-President of the General Assembly, 
Ambassador Peter Thomson, was appointed Special 
Envoy for the Ocean by Secretary-General Guterres 
and is now coordinating follow-up action. In retro-
spect, some observers criticised the elaborate Oceans 
Conference for draining much UNDESA energy shortly 
Chart 1 
Extensive Tasks of the HLPF 
Chart based on Eleni Dellas, Alexander Carius, Marianne Beisheim, Susan Parnell and Dirk Messner, Local and Regional Governments 
in the Follow-up and Review of Global Sustainability Agendas (Berlin and Brussels: adelphi/Cities Alliance, 2018), 18. 
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before the HLPF in July 2017, and thus making the 
other HLPF preparations suffer. Currently, its limited 
capacities do not allow UNDESA to hold such a con-
ference for each SDG. 
The preparatory processes for the different SDG 
Reviews at the HLPF 2018 varied quite a bit. To prepare 
the review of SDG 7 (Energy), a global conference was 
held, this time in late February and co-organised by 
the regional Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok.66 Reviewing SDG 7 
is difficult because the institutional landscape of the 
energy sector is fragmented and relevant institutions 
are located outside the UN system. What was new is 
that, since October 2017, UNDESA had supported an 
informal ad hoc group, which helped to prepare the 
conference and background material for the review 
of SDG 7. This group included not only energy experts 
from relevant UN organisations, but also from the 
International Energy Agency and the World Bank – 
a prerequisite for policy coherence.67 
In the water sector (SDG 6), the reporting processes 
are comparatively well established, since joint moni-
toring programmes have already been put in place 
for MDG 7. Building on this, UN Water coordinates 
the monitoring for SDG 6, with various agencies from 
the UN system providing data and analyses. In pilot 
projects, SDG 6 monitoring focal points were also 
established at country level. Next to the national 
statistical offices these are to include further stake-
holders and data. From November 2017 onwards, a 
UN Water task force prepared a synthesis report for 
the 2018 HLPF review.68 This report, however, was 
published only at the end of June 2018, that is only 
days before the HLPF held the respective SDG Review. 
For SDG 11 (Cities), a special link has been created 
between the sectoral review of the “New Urban 
Agenda” and the HLPF, in the form of a report that 
is to inform the review of SDG 11 every four years.69 
 
66 “Global Preparatory Meeting in Support of the Review 
of SDG7 at the 2018 UN High-Level Political Forum”, https:// 
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/17609 
Global_SDG7_Conference_Main_Programme.pdf (accessed 
18 June 2018). 
67 See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/energy/ 
adhocgroupgoal7 (accessed 18 June 2018). 
68 UN Water, ed., SDG 6 Synthesis Report 2018 on Water 
and Sanitation (Geneva, 2018), http://www.unwater.org/ 
publication_categories/sdg-6-synthesis-report-2018-on-water-
and-sanitation/ (accessed 2 August 2018). 
69 See also Eleni Dellas, Alexander Carius, Marianne Beis-
heim, Susan Parnell and Dirk Messner, Local and Regional 
UN Habitat published the first of these reports in 
early July 2018 – an impressive publication, but 
arriving too late to be processed before the HLPF.70 
During the 2018 HLPF, around 200 representatives 
of local and regional administrative departments 
participated in the first “Local and Regional Govern-
ments’ Forum”. Some of them also reported on their 
implementation efforts at the local level. However, 
since this Forum took place in parallel to the HLPF, it 
was difficult for delegates to participate. 
Various reports are meant to inform the review 
of SDG 17 (means of implementation). The report of the 
ECOSOC “Financing for Development (FFD) Forum”, 
which takes place annually in April, is supposed to 
be discussed at the HLPF.71 This document with inter-
governmentally agreed conclusions and recommen-
dations is negotiated annually before the FFD Forum 
and is based on a monitoring report prepared by an 
inter-agency task force.72 In addition, the co-chairs of 
the “Multi-stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology 
and Innovation for the SDGs” (STI Forum), which 
takes place annually in June, write a “Summary” for 
the HLPF. Here too, an inter-agency task team sup-
ports the preparations. In 2017, a workshop addressed 
the cross-references between STI and the five SDGs 
that were up for review at the 2018 HLPF.73 These 
documents and processes are a good basis for a sub-
stantive review of SDG 17, but they are not sufficiently 
well-known among HLPF participants. Moreover, the 
conflicts of interest already described prevent ground-
breaking intergovernmental decisions. 
 
Governments in the Follow-up and Review of Global Sustainability 
Agendas (Berlin/Brussels: adelphi and Cities Alliance, Febru-
ary 2018). 
70 SDG 11 Synthesis Report 2018: Tracking Progress towards In-
clusive, Safe, Resilient and Sustainable Cities and Human Settlements 
(Nairobi, 2018). 
71 See http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffdforum/about-the-ffd-
forum/index.html (accessed 18 June 2018). 
72 Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing Development, 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffd-follow-up/inter-agency-task-
force.html (accessed 18 June 2018). 
73 See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/ 
documents/17745Meeting_report_final.pdf (accessed 18 June 
2018). 
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External communication, thorough 
analysis, and safeguarding of results 
continue to need improvement. 
Overall, in 2018, the preparatory processes for 
the Thematic and SDG Reviews were organised much 
more effectively, while also being better connected 
with existing processes. Nevertheless, external com-
munication on these preparatory processes, thorough 
analysis, and safeguarding of results continue to need 
improvement. A uniform blueprint for the preparatory 
processes, however, would not make sense since 
the framework conditions of the SDG Reviews differ. 
Nevertheless, DESA should be mandated to develop 
good practice guidelines for these reviews that are suf-
ficiently flexible and yet establish and further devel-
op minimum standards. For example, the custodian 
agencies should urge their task teams to publish a 
roadmap for a preparatory and follow-up process in 
good time. Reports to the HLPF must be available 
much earlier. Only then can solid analyses be carried 
out and relevant national, regional and international 
actors coordinate and plan their input. Responsibili-
ties should be clear, without creating “silos” or giving 
priority to securing resources and mandates. More-
over, the UN should strive to include the international 
financial institutions in a more meaningful way. 
Since 2010, this has been the task of ECESA Plus. 
However, this mechanism has so far essentially been 
limited to an annual briefing and to coordinating 
individual background papers. 
Above all, the Thematic and SDG Reviews should 
not only present data on the agreed indicators, but 
must also analyse them. This analysis should focus 
on relevant interlinkages between goals. Integrated 
assessments should identify entry points for appro-
priate and coherent measures in all relevant policy 
areas.74 Member states should then discuss recom-
mendations for appropriate action. 
In principle, member states must consider how 
they want to work with all these reports on the SDGs 
more meaningfully within the HLPF framework. For 
the next four-year cycle (2020–2023), they must also 
decide how to cluster the goals for the next round of 
 
74 See also Alexander Müller and Ivonne Lobos Alva, SDG 
Thematic Reviews for Integrated Implementation, 27 July 2017, 
http://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/guest-articles/sdg-thematic-
reviews-for-integrated-implementation-what-we-learned-
from-a-review-pilot/ (accessed 18 June 2018). 
SDGs Reviews and how to best link this to the annual 
HLPF themes. 
Voluntary National Reviews: 
A Good but Insufficient Approach 
By the end of the first four-year cycle, 143 member 
states will have voluntarily reported to the HLPF on 
how they are implementing the 2030 Agenda and 
SDGs at the national level.75 Germany already reported 
in 2016 on the first steps and measures implemented 
or planned by the Federal Government. 
Initially, the format of the VNRs was not very well-
defined, either for the underlying written reports or 
for the oral presentations at the HLPF. Shortly after 
the 2016 HLPF, member states agreed a resolution to 
clarify the VNR modalities.76 During the debates, some 
member states questioned much that seemed already 
to have been settled with the resolution on the HLPF 
and the 2030 Agenda. The weaknesses of the current 
follow-up and review mechanism are thus due to po-
litical conflict and compromise. The resolution aims 
at soft learning processes instead of a rigorous review 
of member states’ implementation and accountability 
to their citizens (as demanded by most NGOs). In the 
VNRs, member states are meant to inform each other 
of successes, challenges, and other lessons learned. 
Experiences with the VNR format are also expected 
to generate ideas for new and flexible arrangements 
for future meetings. The Secretary-General was there-
fore invited to update his “voluntary common report-
ing guidelines” for the VNRs on the basis of feedback 
from member states. For this, UNDESA sends question-
naires to VNR participants after the HLPF and asks for 
feedback on preparation, guidelines, and presentation 
format. In general, the resolution calls these guide-
lines a “suggested tool”,77 thus reaffirming the volun-
tary nature of everything related to the VNRs – a con-
stant concern especially of the Russian Federation, 
the US, Australia, and the Group of 77 and China. 
Meanwhile, UNDESA has put together a rather solid 
preparatory process for the VNRs, including a “Hand-
book for the preparation of VNRs”. They also updated 
 
75 162 VNRs in total, minus 19 cases in which countries 
reported for the second and third time respectively. 
76 UNGA, Follow-up and Review (see note 61). 
77 Ibid., para. 9. 
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the guidelines in January 2018.78 However, the status 
of these guidelines, deliberately designed by the mem-
ber states to be voluntary, is weak. For example, de-
spite clear guidance, the majority of VNRs dealt only 
with the goals selected for the SDG Reviews. This was 
never intended. Rather, as the guidelines stipulate, 
member states are asked to focus on their own 
national priorities. 
In general, there is strong interest in VNRs at the 
HLPF. So many countries want to present their VNRs 
that the Secretariat (and, in fact, the HLPF itself in 
terms of time) is reaching the limits of its capacity. 
In 2016, 22 countries reported; in 2017, it was 43; in 
2018 the ECOSOC President called a halt at 48 regis-
trations. Based on previous experience, she tried to 
limit the number to 42 for 2019. Nevertheless, 51 
countries want to report in 2019. While the demand 
is encouraging, it results in extremely limited time 
per country: only 15 minutes remain for each country 
to present its VNR individually or in a panel. 
In principle, the idea is that the VNR at the HLPF is 
only the culmination of a previous national implemen-
tation and review process. In the 2030 Agenda’s own 
words, the VNRs should “promote accountability to 
our citizens”.79 It is therefore crucial that govern-
ments discuss their (draft) reports at the national level 
first. So far, it is unknown how many did so. In devel-
oping countries, UN Country Teams could support 
such processes. Governments should absolutely not 
have the reports written by (externally financed) con-
sultants. In New York, government representatives 
should take the opportunity to share ideas for good 
implementation measures or ask for support for prob-
lems they cannot solve on their own. In part, such 
input has already inspired mutual learning. For in-
stance, many countries took up the ideas presented 
during the 2016 VNRs on how newly-created or 
newly-oriented institutions can guide and coordinate 
the national implementation of the SDGs. Such learn-
ing processes fuel a positive two-level dynamic or 
a “virtuous circle”: national practices inspire other 
countries, international feedback inspires future 
national implementation. 
As an intermediate step, member states are meant 
to exchange views and lessons learned at their regional 
forums. However, UN regional commissions are still 
looking to define their role with regard to the VNRs 
 
78 For these documents see https://sustainabledevelopment. 
un.org/vnrs/ (accessed 18 June 2018). 
79 UNGA, 2030 Agenda (see note 1), para. 73. 
and are doing so very differently. The UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) is rather opposed to the organisation of re-
gional “rehearsals”. The UN Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE) hosted a 1.5-day regional forum 
in Geneva in 2018, with a particular focus on a peer 
learning segment.80 Member states were invited to iden-
tify and discuss case studies from their national con-
texts for the five focal SDGs. To avoid duplication, 
the regional forums could in future focus more on 
regional specifics in the implementation of SDGs, 
for example by discussing cross-border problems 
(e.g. river management) or common challenges (e.g. 
regional climate change or migration). 
Hardly any VNR report presents 
systemic reforms with 
transformative potential. 
Beyond the lack of time at the HLPF for adequate 
reporting, the quality of both written and oral reports 
must be improved. Some reports work with the offi-
cial SDG indicators, others do not. Only very few 
reports offer an in-depth analysis of the data that goes 
beyond a descriptive presentation of trends or analyse 
the causes behind the failures or successes. Hardly 
any report presents systemic reforms with transfor-
mative potential or identifies structural barriers to 
them. Experts like to point out that the presentations 
need to be characterised by self-critical reflection 
and should not be a beauty contest. In fact, most VNR 
presentations focus on development successes. So far, 
it has been mostly the least developed countries that 
have presented their challenges. Many presentations 
are rather technical and avoid politically controver-
sial subjects. For example, neither Turkey nor Egypt 
nor Venezuela addressed the acute political tensions 
in their countries during their VNR presentations. In 
contrast, three other VNRs were highly politicised. 
Armenia and Azerbaijan accused each other of mis-
information during their 2017/18 VNRs (the back-
ground being the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict). In their 
2018 VNR, Palestine tried at least to outline connec-
tions between the conflict with Israel and the lack of 
 
80 ECOSOC/ECE, eds., Report of the Regional Forum on Sustain-
able Development for the UNECE Region on Its Second Session (ECE/ 
RFSD/2018/2) (Geneva: UNECE, 20 April 2018). 
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implementation of the SDGs, but here too the accu-
sations were one-sided.81 
The interactive debate that follows the VNR presenta-
tions suffers from several problems. First, despite the 
specified deadline, written VNR reports are always 
submitted very late, if at all. This makes it difficult 
for other HLPF participants to prepare for substantive 
discussion. Moreover, many reports are only available 
in the respective national language. Second, the total 
debating time of 15 minutes per VNR, each with one 
to two-minute contributions, is too short for more 
complex reasoning. Third, de facto there has been 
little substantial feedback from member states to 
date. State representatives sitting in the plenary ses-
sion (or not even doing that) were only moderately 
interested. Too many other parallel meetings, in-
cluding of the ministers or secretaries of state present, 
seem to siphon off attention. Thus, many seats are 
filled by delegation members who do not have a man-
date to speak to some VNRs. In 2017 and 2018, there 
were no contributions at all from the member states. 
In 2018, only Norway submitted substantive ques-
tions and comments on a large proportion of VNRs. 
And only the Group of Friends of SDG Financing, led 
by Canada and Jamaica, offered support when coun-
tries identified problems. Most entries, however, were 
reminiscent of the Eurovision Song Contest: neigh-
bouring countries distribute praise and friendly ques-
tions, which seem staged. In 2018, some donor coun-
tries and other VNR countries delivered prepared 
statements as well, which again contained mainly 
praise and soft questions. Only MGoS raised tough 
questions on human rights violations or bad gov-
ernance. 
The responses of the VNR countries are kept very 
short due to time constraints. Hence, they are also 
not likely to interest other member states in mutual 
learning as intended. In 2017, obviously prepared 
statements were occasionally read out in place of 
answers – fortunately no occurrences were observed 
in 2018. Some countries ignored critical questions 
from civil society. India set a bad example by not 
allowing critical questions from civil society – a clear 
violation of HLPF rules, which grant these actors ex-
tensive participation rights. At any rate, to date the 
HLPF-VNRs have not made countries justify them-
 
81 The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the USA 
had refused entry visas to the Palestinian delegation. See 
https://www.apnews.com/e03ad331859f4d1093af4fb849737e3e 
(accessed 2 August 2018). 
selves as “duty bearers” before their citizens as “rights 
holders” (as in the reviews of the UN Human Rights 
Council) – but then that was neither their mandate, 
nor is it to be expected in the near future. 
The interactive debate should be 
better prepared and reworked. 
Where reforms are concerned, consideration 
should be given to how the debate could be better pre-
pared. So far, lead discussants have only been used 
for the VNR panel presentations, not the individual 
presentations; their contributions contained solid 
feedback on the VNRs. One possibility would be to ask 
two or three member states to help prepare the inter-
active debate by actively collecting and processing 
comments.82 They should also include shadow reports 
or parallel reports by civil society in preparing for the 
discussion. For example, for the Universal Periodic 
Reviews at the UN Human Rights Council, the Secre-
tariat prepares a “Summary of Stakeholders’ Informa-
tion” for each country. Such a document could then 
be used by member states to prepare the interactive 
debate of VNRs at the HLPF. However, this would have 
to be mandated and Secretariat capacities would need 
to be increased. 
In 2018, UNDESA organised so-called “VNR labs”.83 
During these side events in the evening, participants 
could discuss interlinkages and country experiences 
in a very focused way. This is what the official VNR 
panels could look like. In general, less would be 
more. To focus discussions more on mutual learning 
processes, presenting states should be asked to out-
line transformative implementation measures proven 
to be successful that could inspire other states. They 
should also highlight particular challenges where 
they are politically ready to take action but need 
the support of partners. Thereafter, UNDESA could 
connect or twin states with partners so as to match 
demand and supply, for example as regards policy 
ideas, technologies, financing, or investments. The UN 
system should also take up the information and adapt 
its support measures accordingly. 
Such a targeted follow-up of the VNRs is still lacking. 
The annual UNDESA “Synthesis Report” is helpful 
 
82 Similar to the “troika model” of the UN Human Rights 
Council, see Beisheim, Review Mechanism (see note 58), 17f. 
83 See the Informal Summary https://sustainabledevelop 
ment.un.org/content/documents/20582Summary_of_VNR_ 
Labs_CLEARED.pdf (accessed 2 August 2018). 
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for a cross-country overview of the VNRs.84 However, 
there is no explicit mandate and no reliable financing 
for them. Moreover, the Secretariat, being committed 
to political neutrality, cannot publish unduly critical 
analyses. NGO alliances are much more sceptical in 
their analyses of the VNR reports.85 The secretariat of 
the “Partners for Review” network, initiated by the 
German government, also evaluates the VNR presen-
tations.86 All these analyses increase the VNRs’ visibil-
ity, which could help them to be taken more seriously 
in future. But their potential for implementing the 
2030 Agenda and SDGs can only be increased if VNR 
results can be worked on in a more systematic and 
politically visible way. There is a lack of mandates 
and resources for this. Moreover, a politically relevant 
process could be initiated, such as a high-level panel 
that assesses the results of the VNRs for interesting 
policy ideas and recommendations to be shared at the 
2019 HLPF Summit. 
Participation of Non-State Actors: 
Mixed Results 
The resolution on the HLPF adopted in 2013 provides 
for extensive participation rights for non-state actors 
at all official meetings.87 As in the SDG negotiations, 
contributions from civil society, business or multi-
stakeholder partnerships are intended to help imple-
ment the 2030 Agenda. 
 
84 UNDESA/DSD, 2017 Voluntary National Reviews. Synthesis 
Report (February 2018), https://sustainabledevelopment.un. 
org/content/documents/17109Synthesis_Report_VNRs_2017. 
pdf (accessed 18 June 2018). See also Committee for Devel-
opment Policy (CDP), Voluntary National Review Reports – What 
Do They Report?, CDP Background Paper no. 46 (New York: 
UNDESA, July 2018). 
85 The Spotlight Report (2016 and 2017) of the Civil Society 
Reflection Group on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and the report Progressing National SDGs Implementation. An 
Independent Assessment of the Voluntary National Review Reports 
Submitted to the United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sus-
tainable Development in 2017, published in 2018 by the Cana-
dian Council for International Co-operation. 
86 Partners for Review, Comparative Analysis of 43 VNRs Sub-
mitted to the HLPF 2017. Non-Paper for Discussion (April 2018), 
http://www.partners-for-review.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/ 
05/P4R-Comparative-analysis-of-2017-VNRs.pdf (accessed 
18 June 2018). 
87 UNGA, Format and Organizational Aspects (see note 10), 
para. 14, 15, 16, 22. 
The participation of societal groups in the HLPF is 
primarily organised through the Major Groups and other 
Stakeholders (MGoS) mentioned above. In 2017, the 
non-governmental groups organised therein created 
a complex coordination mechanism for preparing 
the HLPF and involving as many local groups as pos-
sible.88 The main focus of this work is on the written 
and oral comments, starting with the negotiations for 
the Ministerial Declaration, and during the HLPF the 
Thematic Reviews, SDG Reviews, and VNRs. The first 
task must be carried out as early as June, mainly by 
NGO representatives based in New York. In 2016, the 
major groups often only read out calls for more par-
ticipation during the VNRs; in 2018, however, they 
collected and presented substantial contributions. 
These need to be coordinated in an elaborate process, 
since there is only time in each panel for a maximum 
of one or two statements (of one to two minutes 
each). This comes at the expense of the depth and 
quality of the contributions – which were precisely 
the factors that distinguished them during the SDG 
negotiations. For the HLPF-VNRs, it has become the 
custom that questions have to be submitted before-
hand. While this may be useful for preparing an-
swers, it should not be possible for member states to 
reject these questions in advance. Usually, the chairs 
and moderators of the meetings decide whom they 
call; they should be briefed to be aware of the partici-
pation rights of MGoS. Several countries now have 
non-governmental representatives in their VNR dele-
gations, some of whom also speak for a few minutes. 
In 2017, for example, at the last minute, Denmark 
asked non-governmental representatives to make 
such a contribution – a move inspired by other 
countries’ VNR presentations. 
The relevance of (shadow) reports as well as of other 
comments by societal actors on the VNR reports has 
already been outlined. These materials should be 
bundled and made accessible online. The MGoS are 
also organising side events during HLPF breaks, but 
increasingly these have to take place also in parallel 
with official meetings, due to a lack of time. One 
problem with parallel events is that representatives 
especially of small delegations are hard-pressed to 
participate. Moreover, the number of applications for 
side events is far higher than the UN can implement 
on its premises. Due to the need to combine different 
 
88 For its specifications, see https://sustainabledevelop 
ment.un.org/content/documents/12947HLPFMGoSCM-
ToRJan2017.pdf (accessed 2 August 2018). 
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side events, panels are often just as overloaded as offi-
cial plenary sessions, and there is seldom enough 
time for an in-depth discussion. It is also unclear to 
what extent results feed back into the HLPF. 
The one-day “SDG Business Forum” – another 
parallel event – is jointly organised by UNDESA, the 
UN Global Compact, and the International Chamber 
of Commerce. Companies and other business actors have 
been presenting their implementation activities here 
since 2016. The phrase “showcase review of business 
engagement” used on the HLPF website illustrates 
the nature of the event.89 Many NGOs criticise this as 
“bluewashing”, in reference to the blue colour of the 
UN flag. Since 2016, the one-day “Partnership Ex-
change” has also taken place during the HLPF. Again, 
this does not provide for a very rigorous review of 
the UN’s partnerships with business. The UN system 
is still looking for more effective ways to establish 
multi-stakeholder partnerships for the SDGs whilst 
protecting its reputation.90 
Taken together, the time and space for interven-
tions by non-state actors in the official HLPF meetings 
are extremely limited. Since 2017, non-state observers 
of the HLPF have even required a secondary pass 
in addition to the UN Grounds Pass in order to gain 
access to the conference rooms in the UN building; 
both are difficult to obtain. Only 30 to 70 seats in the 
gallery of the negotiation room are available for the 
more than 2,000 registered non-governmental partici-
pants. Also at the national level many NGOs complain 
about a shrinking space for societal actors, both politi-
cally and financially.91 Accordingly, MGoS formulate 
far-reaching demands for their future participation 
in the HLPF.92 To the surprise of many, it is now 
ECOSOC’s NGO Committee, previously so restrictive, 
 
89 SDG Business Forum, https://sustainabledevelopment. 
un.org/hlpf/SDGBusinessForum (accessed 18 June 2018). 
90 For more information, see Marianne Beisheim and Anne 
Ellersiek, Partnerships for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment. Transformative, Inclusive and Accountable? SWP Research 
Paper 14/2017 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
December 2017). 
91 See Civicus, ed., 2018 State of Civil Society Report, https:// 
www.civicus.org/index.php/state-of-civil-society-report-2018 
(accessed 18 June 2018). 
92 MGoS HLPF/Coordination Mechanism/Steering Group, 
ed., MGoS Priority Recommendations for Strengthening the HLPF 
(New York, March 2017). 
that is to discuss how the participation of non-state 
actors could be improved.93 
The Global Sustainable Development 
Report as Science-Policy Interface 
To strengthen the exchange between science and 
politics at the HLPF, the UN member states proposed a 
Global Sustainable Development Report (GSDR) as long ago 
as 2012 in Rio. From 2014 to 2016 UNDESA coordinated 
three pilot editions – until July 2016 when, after 
long consultations, member states agreed on a man-
date for the GSDR, which will now be issued every 
four years.94 In December 2016, the Secretary-General 
appointed the Independent Group of Scientists (IGS), 
a team of 15 independent international scientists, 
which is currently working on the 2019 edition of the 
GSDR. Its mandate is to evaluate existing analyses (as 
an assessment of assessments) and provide guidance 
on the state of global sustainable development from 
a scientific perspective, including examining policy 
options. It will cover the entire four-year cycle and 
also investigate new and emerging issues and pre-
viously neglected topics. In addition, IGS members 
are invited to speak annually at the HLPF. 
A UN Task Team supports the group of scientists.95 
Nevertheless, compared with other panels, such as 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), the IGS is very poorly equipped which limits its 
working methods. Like the IPCC, the IGS is not meant 
to conduct new research, but summarise existing 
research results. However, the IPCC’s work process is 
much more differentiated: it has highly specialised 
working groups and multi-level peer review and 
 
93 See para. 22 of the Annex of UNGA, Review of the Imple-
mentation of General Assembly Resolution 68/1 on the Strengthening 
of the Economic and Social Council (A/RES/72/305) (New York: UN, 
25 July 2018). 
94 Published as Annex of the 2016 HLPF Ministerial Decla-
ration (E/HLS/2016/1): Global Sustainable Development Report: 
Scope, Frequency, Methodology and Relationship with the Sustainable 
Development Goals Progress Report, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/11
654Annex_Min_declaration_HLPF2016.pdf (accessed 18 June 
2018). 
95 This consists of members of the UN Secretariat, the UN 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, the UN En-
vironment Programme, the UN Development Programme, 
the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and the 
World Bank. 
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coordination processes, many plenary sessions and 
progress reports, and the negotiated “Summary for 
Policymakers”.96 The latter is negotiated sentence-by-
sentence and thus subject to political influence. The 
three scientific reports of the IPCC, which together 
total several thousand pages, are not affected by this. 
More than 800 scientists worldwide are involved in 
drafting them. 
By necessity, the IGS adopted a different working 
method for the GSDR 2019. In 2017, it had published 
an open “Call for Inputs” aimed at scientists and 
other knowledge carriers worldwide.97 The call iden-
tified four areas in which input was requested: (1) in-
teractions among SDGs and their targets, (2) trans-
formation pathways towards sustainable develop-
ment; (3) looking beyond the SDGs (major issues iden-
tified by research which are not explicitly taken into 
account in the SDGs), and (4) the role of science for sus-
tainable development. It remains to be seen whether 
the IGS will succeed in mobilising science – it does 
not have many incentives to offer. In addition, capac-
ities in developing countries need to be strengthened, 
since usually only a minimal proportion of scientific 
studies originate from them. This could be done 
through national science platforms. 
Although there is no uniform recipe 
for successful science-policy inter-
faces, some factors are important. 
It is difficult to predict what expectations the 2019 
GSDR will be able to meet. The scientific debate about 
such science-policy interfaces shows that although there 
is no uniform recipe for success, some factors are 
nevertheless important.98 They include suitable equip-
ment, a secretariat with a budget, the effective com-
munication of results, and action-relevant recommen-
 
96 “Was macht der Weltklimarat? Wie der IPCC zu seinen 
Ergebnissen kommt”, in Perspektive Erde. Forschung zum globalen 
Wandel, 02/2013, ed. BMBF and Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- 
und Raumfahrt (September 2013) See also John Broome, 
“At the IPCC”, London Review of Books Blog, 8 May 2014, https:// 
www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2014/05/08/john-broome/at-the-ipcc/ 
(Zugriff am 3 October 2018). 
97 Global Sustainable Development Report: Call for Inputs, https:// 
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/17102 
Call_for_inputs_PDF.pdf, (accessed 18 June 2018). 
98 On this debate, see Alexander Bogner and Helge Tor-
gersen, eds., Wozu Experten? Ambivalenzen der Beziehung von 
Wissenschaft und Politik (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2005). 
dations. Studies recommend approaches aimed at 
mutual exchange and joint learning.99 In some cases, 
they even call for a second expertise with a special 
mediating function to be included in addition to the 
specialist expertise, so that findings can be worked 
up into actionable policy recommendations.100 Other 
contributions instead emphasise the relevance of (the 
often lacking) political receptiveness, especially when 
recommendations ask for far-reaching change. On 
the recipient side, too, understanding, incentives and 
capacities for better research-uptake must therefore 
be strengthened.101 
As the Summary of the first Multi-Stakeholder 
Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation noted, 
the 2030 Agenda is particularly challenging because 
it is disruptive in its claim to transformation and call 
for radical change.102 At the same time, this UN docu-
ment, like many others, calls for evidence-based 
policy making and policy coherence, which is of great 
importance given the integrated approach of the 2030 
Agenda. However, it is a (sadly frequent) misjudge-
ment on the part of many subject-oriented scientists 
to assume that both are almost automatically a goal 
of politics, and that integrated assessments are there-
fore correspondingly in demand and effective instru-
ments of policy advice. This underestimates the po-
litical dimension of decision making, meaning such 
factors as conflicting interests, bureaucratic politics 
and the safeguarding of domain and departmental 
interests, turf battles over mandates and budgets, and 
considerations regarding career paths. Representa-
tives from Science and Technology Studies especially 
emphasise this kind of “politics of science”.103 In part, 
 
99 Anita Engels, “The Science-policy Interface”, The Integrated 
Assessment Journal 5, no. 1 (2005): 7–26; Rolf Lidskog and 
Göran Sundqvist, “When Does Science Matter? International 
Relations Meets Science and Technology Studies”, Global En-
vironmental Politics 15, no. 1 (February 2015): 1–20. 
100 Thomas Saretzki, “Welches Wissen – wessen Entschei-
dung? Kontroverse Expertise im Spannungsfeld von Wissen-
schaft, Öffentlichkeit und Politik”, in Wozu Experten?, ed. Bog-
ner and Torgersen (see note 98), 345–69. 
101 In 2018 the UN Joint Inspection Unit has implemented 
a project entitled “Strengthening the policy research uptake 
in service of the 2030 Agenda”. 
102 ECOSOC, Multi-stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and 
Innovation for the Sustainable Development Goals: Summary by the 
Co-Chairs (E/HLPF/2016/6) (New York, 24 June 2016), para. 4. 
103 Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policy-
makers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); 
Sheila Jasanoff, ed., States of Knowledge: The Co-production of 
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this results in the inconsistency of “talk, decision, and 
action”,104 especially when decision makers are con-
fronted with conflicting demands. In such situations, 
political action is often characterised by unclear 
preferences and mixed motives, which makes purely 
rational decisions unlikely.105 Scientific advice can 
only be successful if there is openness to policy alter-
natives. 
Meaningful narratives could be helpful in such 
situations,106 as could a broad consensus on what may 
be considered authoritative knowledge,107 or a shared 
perception of problems and challenges (that should 
go beyond the scientific community).108 There is a 
lively debate on whether it is the task of science itself 
to build such consensus or not: while some vote for 
science to be independent and autonomous,109 others 
– such as the representatives of the international 
research programme for global sustainability, Future 
Earth – believe that a joint “transdisciplinary”110 co-
production of knowledge is the better approach.111 
 
Science and the Social Order (London: Routledge, 2004); Wozu 
Experten?, ed. Bogner and Torgersen (see note 98). 
104 Nils Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy. Talk, Deci-
sions and Actions in Organizations (Copenhagen: Business School 
Press, 2. ed., 2002). 
105 Stephen D. Krasner, “Planning and Garbage Cans: A 
Framework for Locating Policy Planning”, in Avoiding Trivia: 
The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy, ed. 
Daniel W. Drezner (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2009), 159–71. 
106 Paul C. Avey and Michael C. Desch, “What Do Policy-
makers Want From Us? Results of a Survey of Current and 
Former Senior National Security Decision Makers”, Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 58, no. 2 (2014): 227–46. 
107 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities 
and International Policy Coordination”, International Organi-
zation 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 1–35. 
108 David J. Griggs and T. S. Kestin, “Bridging the Gap 
between Climate Scientists and Decision Makers”, Climate 
Research 47, no. 1–2 (2011): 139–44. 
109 Peter M. Haas and Casey Stevens, “Organized Science, 
Usable Knowledge, and Multilateral Environmental Govern-
ance, in Governing the Air: The Dynamics of Science, Policy, and 
Citizen Interaction, ed. Rolf Lidskog and Göran Sundqvist (Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 125–61. 
110 “Transdisciplinary” refers not only to the interaction 
between several disciplines, but also between scientists and 
non-scientists. 
111 Wolfram Mauser et al., “Transdisciplinary Global 
Change Research: The Co-creation of Knowledge for Sustain-
ability”, Current opinion in Environmental Sustainability 5, no. 3 
(September 2013): 420–31; Armin Grunwald, “Transforma-
The President of the DFG (German Research Founda-
tion), however, warned against a scientocracy and the 
tyranny of experts undermining the democratic prin-
ciples of open societies, and against science losing its 
openness and pluralism.112 
What experts agree on is that the high credibility 
and transparency of scientists’ work and transfer pro-
cesses are important. For example, science should not 
conceal uncertainties.113 Thus far, the public knows 
hardly anything about the GSDR process. The com-
mittee lacks the resources for the sophisticated meas-
ures mentioned above. 
The Ministerial Declaration – 
without HLPF Results 
At the end of the HLPF, which meets annually in July 
under the auspices of ECOSOC, the member states 
adopt the Ministerial Declaration, first by acclamation 
at the end of the HLPF (for the first time by vote in 
2018), and then again formally on the following 
day as part of the ECOSOC President’s report to the 
ECOSOC High-Level Segment. 
One problem is that the Ministerial Declaration 
is already being negotiated before the HLPF (usually 
in June). In other words, it cannot present any HLPF 
results and incorporates hardly any analysis from 
the thematic, national, or regional learning processes. 
Consequently, it is not very action-oriented and does 
not provide the political leadership and guidance for 
further implementation that is expected from the 
HLPF according to its mandate. 
In addition, the Minster Declaration is negotiated 
intergovernmentally. Non-state actors can be involved 
only if the two facilitators (two UN ambassadors who 
organise the negotiations at the invitation of the 
President of the General Assembly) support this and 
no member state objects. Even then, only a few New 
York based NGO representatives participate in these 
negotiations. 
However, the disappointing outcome document 
is not only due to the unfortunate timing of the nego-
 
tive Wissenschaft – eine neue Ordnung im Wissenschafts-
betrieb?”, GAIA 24, no. 1 (January 2015): 17–20. 
112 Peter Strohschneider, “Zur Politik der Transformativen 
Wissenschaft”, in Die Verfassung des Politischen, ed. André Bro-
docz et al. (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2014), 175–92. 
113 Sarah Cornell et al., “Opening up Knowledge Systems 
for Better Responses to Global Environmental Change”, En-
vironmental Science & Policy 28 (April 2013): 60–70. 
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tiations, but also to a politically difficult situation. 
The Ministerial Declaration negotiated at the UN’s 
New York headquarters reflects the lines of conflict 
there. It is currently almost impossible to go beyond 
the agreed contents of the 2030 Agenda – it is 
enough of a struggle to preserve them. This relates, 
for example, to the sections on means of implemen-
tation, where debates between North and South are 
rekindled. Other contentious issues that have ham-
pered consensus in recent years are women’s rights, 
sexual and reproductive health and rights, and now 
also the multilateral trade and climate regime. Last 
but not least, the wording on the right to self-deter-
mination of peoples living under colonial and foreign 
occupation has been an issue in every final plenary. 
In 2018, the US requested a recorded vote on the 
document as a whole – which meant that for the 
first time the Ministerial Declaration was not adopted 
by consensus, as the US and Israel voted against it. 
In her explanatory statement, the US representative 
criticised what she saw as the inappropriate politi-
cisation of the agenda and floated the question of 
whether funds raised for the negotiations of the 
Ministerial Declaration would not be better used 
for the national implementation of the SDGs.114 
The added value of the Ministerial 
Declaration is currently limited. 
To summarise, the added value of the document 
is currently limited, since it only takes stock of trends 
and challenges and lists very general commitments. 
Moreover, the conflicts mean that, in the best case, 
agreed wording from older documents is merely 
repeated. In contrast, the Summary prepared by the 
ECOSOC President following the HLPF takes up the 
HLPF results and also presents recommendations from 
the meetings. However, there is only a weak mandate 
for this document;115 it has therefore hardly any offi-
cial political significance. Even the Ministerial Decla-
ration has no direct or binding effect: since the HLPF 
has no decision-making powers of its own, the docu-
ment goes via ECOSOC to the General Assembly. 
Nevertheless, pragmatists point out that it is impor-
 
114 See press release https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ 
ecosoc6943.doc.htm (accessed 10 August 2018). 
115 See the first footnote of the President’s Summary 
of the 2018 HLPF, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ 
content/documents/205432018_HLPF_Presidents_summary_ 
FINAL.pdf (accessed 10 August 2018). 
tant to maintain a negotiated ministerial declaration 
so that high-ranking politicians come to New York. 
But they should then also be able to make forward-
looking policy recommendations. As it stands, during 
the general debate, their microphone is turned off 
after a few minutes, and their contributions no longer 
influence the final document. Neither helps to in-
crease their political interest in the HLPF. It remains 
to be seen to what extent this will be the case with 
the concise “Political Declaration”, to be adopted by 
the Heads of State and Government at the HLPF in 
September 2019 under the auspices of the General 
Assembly. Also relevant in this context: for the eight-
day HLPF to be held in July 2019, no Ministerial Dec-
laration is to be negotiated, meaning that it is cur-
rently completely open how the results of this meet-
ing will be documented. 
Ultimately, this is where the basic conflict over 
the importance of the HLPF resurges, which already 
burdened the negotiations on its mandate in 2012–
2013: should the HLPF merely be a “platform” for 
non-binding intergovernmental exchange, at the end 
of which a negotiated document is adopted by con-
sensus (this is the position of the Russian Federation, 
among others), or should it be a high-level forum 
(with universal membership) that takes relevant 
decisions on the future course of action? 
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General Recommendations for the HLPF 
Review 2019–20 
The HLPF was established in 2013, two years before 
the 2030 Agenda was adopted. As a result, its working 
methods and practices cannot match the level of 
ambition of the 2030 Agenda. As early as 2016, UN 
member states had decided to review the “format and 
organizational aspects” of the HLPF at the 74th session 
of the General Assembly, “in order to benefit from 
lessons learned in the first cycle of the forum”.116 In 
general, member states must decide whether they 
want to expand the currently overloaded HLPF (for 
example with more days for meetings) or streamline its 
mandate. Unfortunately, member states tend to want 
ever more with (even) fewer resources. Ultimately, 
this leaves everyone dissatisfied. The HLPF can only 
gain political significance if it is mandated to take 
relevant decisions and give policy guidance. Only then will 
high-ranking politicians develop an interest in partici-
pating. For this, the format of the two-day HLPF under 
the auspices of the General Assembly must likewise 
be reconsidered. It would be important to prepare the 
outcome document of that summit – the mandated 
“Political Declaration” – in such a way as to provide 
effective political guidance for the further implemen-
tation of the 2030 agenda. 
Concrete reform ideas have already been presented 
on important HLPF building blocks – the Thematic 
and SDG Reviews, VNRs, and the participation of non-
governmental actors and scientists. From the outset, 
there was a consensus that the HLPF should not dupli-
cate existing multilateral processes on the topics 
of individual SDGs. Instead, the forum should build 
on them, foregrounding the principles of the 2030 
Agenda (transformation, integration, inclusiveness). 
For this to succeed, data, trends and policies from 
relevant sectoral processes must be evaluated and 
 
116 UNGA, Follow-up and Review (see note 61), para. 21. 
analysed sufficiently early in the run-up to the HLPF. 
This would at least provide a basis (although not a 
guarantee) for high-level representatives of the Mem-
ber States to discuss policy recommendations during 
the HLPF and, at best, also mandate and resource their 
implementation. 
“Reports” are not “reviews” – the 
latter require evaluation and analysis. 
In the empirical analysis of the HLPF’s current 
working methods and practices, it became clear that 
it is precisely these preparatory and follow-up processes 
that are lacking. Relevant reports must be available 
significantly earlier in the year so that they can be 
taken up by the delegates before negotiations on the 
HLPF Ministerial Declaration begin. “Reports” are 
not “reviews” – the latter require evaluation and 
analysis. More time and resources are needed for that. 
Here, it is helpful that the latest resolution on the 
ECOSOC review has called on the UN Secretariat to ad-
just the ECOSOC calendar and the reporting arrange-
ments of its subsidiary bodies.117 UNDESA’s capacity 
must also be strengthened so that incoming reports 
can be better synthesised and results communicated 
more effectively. Especially when preparing the 
Thematic and SDG Reviews, the UN system’s intensive 
cooperation from the Post-2015 negotiations should 
be continued. The same applies to consultations with 
non-state actors. The preparatory processes and their 
results should be communicated more intensively 
and transparently to the outside world. Moreover, 
the national teams preparing the HLPF should be 
strengthened. They should also be involved more in 
negotiating the Ministerial Declaration. It is not help-
ful if only representatives from the New York UN 
 
117 UNGA, Review of the Implementation of General Assembly 
Resolution 68/1 (see note 93), para. 31. 
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missions negotiate, because then the usual conflicts 
tend to dominate. 
The drafting of the HLPF’s programme could be 
supported by an “Advisory Programme Committee” 
that for example could assist the search for suitable 
panellists. The moderators of the HLPF panels should 
insist that invited panellists take note of all relevant 
reports to the HLPF and formulate policy-relevant 
recommendations based on them (rather than merely 
represent their own topics and interests). These rec-
ommendations should be based on the overarching 
principles of the 2030 Agenda. 
Beyond that, member states could also decide to 
hold a one-week preparatory meeting in late May.118 
By then, the Secretary-General’s SDG report, the re-
ports from the UN system, the synthesis reports for 
the SDG reviews, and VNR reports (or at least the so-
called “main messages”) should be available. Such an 
HLPF Spring Meeting could then hold the Thematic and 
SDG reviews. Results could feed into the negotiations 
on the Ministerial Declaration in June, which on this 
basis could and should contain more substantial 
recommendations. In July, these recommendations 
should be discussed at ministerial level during the 
three-day high-level segment of the HLPF. To make 
more time for this, the VNRs that are not presented 
by heads of state and government or ministers could 
be moved to the other HLPF days. 
To summarise, member states should mandate and 
enable the UN to organise processes earlier and more 
transparent, integrated and analytical when it comes to 
the preparation and then follow up of the HLPF’s 
building blocks and corresponding results. If member 
states cannot bring themselves to relieve the Secre-
tariat and the ECOSOC agenda by giving up historically 
outdated mandates, then they will have to make 
new additional resources available for this. Finally, 
it should also be transparent how the results of the 
HLPF are subsequently implemented. 
Building the Political Will for Reform 
The existing political momentum for an ambitious 
reform of the HLPF should be further expanded. 
 
118 To avoid the usual dispute over the number of meeting 
days, the preparatory week could use three days of the HLPF, 
plus one day each of the ECOSOC Integration Segment and the 
Development Cooperation Forum. The HLPF in July would then 
comprise only five days instead of eight. 
António Guterres had already presented his reform 
programme to the General Assembly as part of his 
application as UN Secretary-General. Inter alia, he 
advocates a new management paradigm: respon-
sibility is to be decentralised, overlaps reduced, and 
processes designed more efficiently.119 As the plans 
become more concrete, conflicts of interest have 
emerged, but the legitimacy of these administrative 
reforms remains high.120 It would therefore be wise 
to consider how the reforms of the HLPF fit in with 
further UN reform processes. 
With regard to the HLPF, the ECOSOC Review is of 
particular importance. In 2013, the General Assembly 
adopted reforms to the functioning of the Economic 
and Social Council.121 Since then, the cycle of ECOSOC 
meetings has been running from July to July. Since 
2016, the annual topics of ECOSOC and HLPF have 
been coordinated with reference to the 2030 Agenda. 
Since 2017, the last day of the ECOSOC High Level 
Segment has been directly connected to the HLPF and 
was used for the first time in 2018 to discuss trends 
and scenarios. In July 2018, the UN General Assembly 
adopted a resolution on further reforms.122 From now 
on, the one-day Integration Segment of ECOSOC will 
be held directly before the HLPF to process the input 
from member states, the UN system, and other rele-
vant stakeholders; develop action-oriented recom-
mendations for follow-up and feed into the ensuing 
HLPF. How this is to be achieved within the frame-
work of a single day is unclear. However, it will be 
tested in 2019 and then reviewed at the 74th session 
of the General Assembly as part of the broader review 
of Council segments and meetings, along with the 
format of the HLPF. 
The reforms of UNDESA, demanded by the member 
states in 2016 and started in spring 2018, have also 
brought innovations for the HLPF.123 The secretariat 
functions for the HLPF are now shared between the 
newly named Office of Intergovernmental Support 
 
119 UNGA, Shifting the Management Paradigm in the United 
Nations (A/72/492) (New York: UN, September 2017). This 
document is mainly about internal administrative proce-
dures rather than political decision-making processes. 
120 Beate Wagner, “António Guterres – Ein Jahr im Amt”, 
in: Vereinte Nationen 66, no. 1 (2018): 26–30. 
121 UNGA, Review of the Implementation of General Assembly 
Resolution 61/16 on the Strengthening of the Economic and Social 
Council (A/RES/68/1) (New York: UN, 20 September 2013). 
122 UNGA, Review of the Implementation of General Assembly 
Resolution 68/1 (see note 93), para 11. 
123 See UNGA, Follow-up and Review (see note 61), para. 16. 
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and Coordination for Sustainable Development (for-
merly ECOSOC Support Office) and the Division for 
Sustainable Development Goals, which has also been 
renamed (earlier DSD). The former focuses on inter-
governmental processes, including the HLPF, while 
the latter takes over the substantive support and 
capacity building to the SDGs, including responsibility 
for the GSDR and SDG partnerships. It is to be hoped 
that this reform will help to improve the cooperative 
support for the HLPF. 
In the context of the debate on Revitalising the 
General Assembly, discussions include how the agendas 
of the General Assembly, ECOSOC and HLPF can be 
better coordinated and linked to the 2030 Agenda.124 
Unnecessary duplication and overlap shall also be ad-
dressed. In the literature, strengthening the General 
Assembly is seen as a good means for overcoming 
potential blockages in the Security Council or in the 
ECOSOC through majority-decisions.125 
It is essential, to press ahead with the 
preparations for the HLPF Summit. 
A test for this could be the two-day HLPF, which 
will take place on 24/25 September 2019 at the level 
of heads of state and government under the auspices 
of the General Assembly. To achieve a substantial 
result beyond the lowest common denominator, it is 
essential to press ahead with the preparations for this 
Summit. In the “Political Declaration” to be negotiated 
there, member states should also give a clear impetus 
to the reforms needed to make the HLPF “fit for pur-
pose”. 
The reform of the UN Development System (UNDS), 
which has already been decided and is now being 
implemented, should help the UN to work on the 
SDGs more effectively.126 In 2017, the Secretary-
 
124 See https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/ 
sites/51/2018/07/Alignment-signed-letter-dated-18-July-
2018.pdf (accessed 16 August 2018). 
125 Engelhardt, Weltgemeinschaft am Abgrund (see note 19). 
126 This has already been a long process: from 2014 as 
the Dialogue on the longer-term positioning of the UN development 
system and since 2106 in the context of the Quadrennial Com-
prehensive Policy Review of operational activities for development of 
the UN system (QCPR), including the report by the Independent 
Team of Advisors (ITA), Findings and Conclusions. The Future We 
Want – The United Nations We Need, 16 June 2016, http://www. 
un.org/ecosoc/sites/www.un.org.ecosoc/files/files/en/qcpr/ita-
findings-and-conclusions-16-jun-2016.pdf. See also Stephen 
General published two reports containing reform 
proposals.127 In late May 2018, member states agreed 
on a resolution that largely supports Guterres’s 
reform proposals, albeit with reservations and con-
ditions.128 The reforms are primarily aimed at more 
efficient UN structures and processes at national and 
regional level. Specifically, the UN Resident Coordina-
tors and UN Country Teams are to be strengthened 
and their funding stabilised. However, experts rightly 
consider this reform as “unfinished business”– many 
questions will still need to be answered during imple-
mentation.129 This includes better coordination 
between the UNDS and the HLPF. 
As part of the Sustaining Peace debate,130 member 
states and experts have been discussing the links 
between peace and development for some time, 
initially under the heading “Human Security”, now 
as the “Development-Humanitarian-Peacebuilding 
Nexus”. In addition to reforming the peace and secu-
rity architecture, the UN Secretary-General wants 
to extend institutional responsibility for conflict pre-
vention to the entire UN system. In this context, priority 
will be given to expanding capacities of UN entities 
working at the national and local level. As regards the 
HLPF, the Russian Federation has expressed concerns 
over efforts to deal with security-related issues in this 
forum, claiming such issues were the Security Coun-
cil’s responsibility. Russia also rejects any interference 
in internal affairs under the banner of prevention, 
as well as a corresponding extension of the powers 
of the UN Secretariat. These conflicts are likely to 
arise again in the work on SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and 
Strong Institutions) scheduled for 2019. 
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Taken together, the outcome of these reform debates 
will influence how ambitious the reforms of the HLPF 
can be. Status quo interests and potential blockades 
should be analysed and taken into account. In par-
ticular, the reservations of the Russian Federation 
(among others) and also the conflict between the US 
and the Group of 77 and China (which in 2019 will be 
presided by Palestine) will weigh on reform efforts. 
Elections have also been held in many countries since 
2015, and perhaps not all new governments share the 
previous government’s support for the 2030 Agenda 
and SDGs. 
At the same time, these reform processes create a 
momentum that interested member states should 
use to tackle the HLPF Review, planned for 2019–20, 
with real commitment. The experience of the nego-
tiations on the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda shows how 
important leadership and ownership are for successful 
negotiations. In February 2018, in its coalition agree-
ment, the new German government stated twice that 
“the implementation of Agenda 2030 and the promo-
tion of sustainable development” is the “benchmark 
for government action”.131 It planned to strengthen 
the United Nations and would also increase funds and 
orientate them more strategically. In this spirit, the 
Federal Government, together with Sweden, could 
revitalise the 2015 “High-Level Group” in support of 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda, together with 
other heads of state and government, or alternatively 
found a new group of friends. In Europe, interested 
parties might include the Nordic countries (especially 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway), France (VNR and 
G7 Presidency in 2019), the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Switzerland. International partners could be Colom-
bia (as initiator of the SDGs), Ecuador (Presidency 
of the 73rd General Assembly), Republic of Korea (Co-
Chair Friends of Governance for Sustainable Develop-
ment), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (ECOSOC 
Presidency), and other small island developing states 
(SIDS). 
Such a group could try to convince the General 
Assembly to call on the Secretary-General to present a 
report no later than early 2020 setting out options for 
HLPF reform based on the experience of the first four-
 
131 See https://www.cdu.de/koalitionsvertrag-2018 
(accessed 5 July 2018), 137, 144f., 160. 
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year cycle (see Chart 2). To prepare for this, the Group 
could provide resources with the help of which the 
Secretary-General could appoint a small expert panel 
to develop options for reforms, consult widely with 
member states and stakeholders on this, and present 
results in autumn 2019. A first interim report from 
the expert panel could already inform the negotia-
tions on the Political Declaration for the HLPF Summit 
of Heads of State and Government in September 2019. 
Intergovernmental negotiations could begin in spring 
2020, and the agreed reforms could be adopted at the 
latest in the context of the 75th anniversary of the UN. 
The German government should pro-actively sup-
port efforts to make the HLPF an effective key insti-
tution in the UN system. With this commitment it 
could make it clear that it continues to uphold effec-
tive multilateralism and sustainable development as 
guiding principles of its foreign policy. 
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